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"Firepower Kills": The Evolution of French Infantry Tactics at Verdun
James R. Chrislip
The Battle of Verdun was one of the most calamitous events of the twentieth century. This "microcosm
of the First World War" symbolized not only the absurd fratricide of the Great War but also the
incredible damage done to France.[1] Verdun produced some of the most innovative tactical and
strategic developments of the war. Despite the claims of some historians that "it would be of little value
to discuss tactics [at Verdun]… because there does not seem to have been any," there was a
considerable tactical difference between the French Army during the offensives of 1915 and their
assault on the Somme, after Verdun in the summer of 1916.[2] Marshal Joseph Joffre called Verdun the
"the hardest… best practical school of application the French Army ever had."[3] Through the usage of
intentional, low-level retreats, complex defensive positions, and a calculated concentration of
firepower, the Armée de Terre adopted an effective and advanced form of tactical defensive operations.
This paper, using the 153e Régiment d'Infanterie as a case study, will analyze both the impact and the
effectiveness of the various doctrinal and technological developments that affected the ordinary poilu of
the French Army.[4] While these doctrines were not yet perfected, Verdun provides to historians a vital
link in the Armée de Terre's development and played an important role in its ultimate victory.[5]
The historiography of the French Army of the Great War varies in its focus. Verdun, especially, was a
cataclysmic psychological event for France and produced considerable research on the social effects of
the battle.[6] Many general histories of Verdun were written just after the war, and were often
inaccurate.[7] A new wave was introduced in the 1960s, including the venerable works by Georges
Blond and Alistair Horne.[8] More recently, works by David Mason, Malcolm Brown, and Alain Denizot
provided fresh looks at the conduct and implications of the battle.[9] For the French Army over the
course of the whole war, Leonard Smith published a considerable amount on the psychological strains,
and Anthony Clayton produced a strong book regarding the evolution of the French Army.[10] Colonel
Robert Doughty also provided a solid treatise detailing the strategic decisions and changes made by
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GQG.[11] The image of French strategy has changed from a caricature of inept generals trapped in a
post-Napoleonic mindset to a force which "proceeded pragmatically" and suffered "more from a refusal
to quit fighting… than from a vain search for glory or an unwillingness to innovate and
adapt."[12] However, the changes at the regimental level of the French infantry are mostly untouched
by historians. French developments are generally seen to be in the motorization of logistics and
the barrage roulant.[13] The role of the infantry has been viewed mainly as a victim of the artillery. In
fact, tactically, the Armée de Terre underwent a tremendous shift during the war from a mobile attack
force to a defensive behemoth. Convinced that their defeat in 1870 resulted from "the lack of offensive
spirit," the French attached themselves to the aggressive Attaque à l'Outrance strategy.[14] But
disastrous early campaigns ended the concept of the unsupported infantry assault. In the eyes of one
historian, "artillery ruled the battlefield," which forced the strategists at GQG to rethink the use of their
most fragile resource, manpower.[15] This gave rise to the simple phrase which dominated French
military thinking for the next twenty years: "Le feu tue," or 'firepower kills.' The French Firepower
doctrine can be defined as providing the largest amount of the best possible weapons to the greatest
proportion of soldiers and placing them in a position to inflict the highest number of casualties on the
enemy.
The key to this doctrine was French weapons development. While some authors maintain that "the
French Army was ill-served by its small arms manufacturers," and that their weapons were generally
inferior to their German counterparts, by 1916 this disparity had been largely removed.[16] This left the
French with comparable, though usually not superior, weapons to their opponents. The superior
Berthier rifle had already largely replaced the aging Lebel, and the standard St. Etienne Mle 1907
machinegun, which was "excellent, but too fragile," was replaced by the "rustic and uniform" Hotchkiss
Mle 1914. [17] At the opening of 1916, the 153e RI possessed two Compagnies de Mitrailleuse de
Régiment (CMR), each with eight machineguns.[18] In addition, they were assigned aCompagnie de
Mitrailleuse de Brigade (CMB), which remained with them for the duration of the battle.[19] These
CMRs were consistently placed in the first line of the French defense. Explosives developments had
reached the front in the forms of personal grenades, rifle grenades, mortars, and light cannon. These
weapons could potentially "demoralize the enemy and inflict upon him greater losses than are caused
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by the artillery bombardment."[20] This was particularly encouraging, as throughout the entire year of
1916, the French arms industry only produced 590 heavy guns.[21]This dearth of firepower, which
encouraged Joffre to pull most of the heavy artillery from the Meuse fortresses, consequently led to
heavy casualties for the French at Verdun. The unsuccessful Artois offensive "demonstrated the need for
…artillery that could support the infantry."[22] Until French arms manufacturers could address this
inadequacy, the infantry had to compensate for the artillery's deficiencies.
At the time of Verdun in early February 1916 the 153e RI received a new commander. Camille-Charles
Biesse was a graduate of l'Ecole Supérieure de Guerre class of 1893. Described as an "officer of great
valor, of an untiring zeal and activity… of the most brilliant qualities of decision making," he was
promoted to command the regiment on December 12, 1915.[23] Up to that point the regiment had
gone through eleven different commanding officers. Five were killed or wounded in the line of duty.
While this situation was not uncommon in the French infantry, it did little to help the morale of the
average poilu.[24] The situation was not much better among battalion commanders. Ten different
commandants led the three battalions before Verdun. Those present at the beginning of the battle were
all killed or wounded, as well as two of their replacements. By January 1916, the 153e RI had suffered
5,200 casualties among the poilus and officers.[25] Considering that the maximum strength of the
regiment the day before their first action at Verdun was 2,720 men and 50 officers, it is surprising how a
unit which suffered such debilitating losses over so short a period of time maintained such a consistently
high level of competence.
The answer lies in the fact that there was a stable cadre of poilus and non-commissioned officers who
remained with the 153e RI throughout the duration of the conflict. Once these men survived the initial
battles, they could train and discipline the newly-arriving replacements. This group consisted of only a
few hundred men, but their influence can be seen through the regiment's actions in each of the major
French campaigns of the war. Many reinforcements also arrived from regiments devastated by previous
combat. During the first months of 1916, 535 men were added in this manner with another 790 men
arriving from conscription classes.[26] Because such a large percentage of their reinforcements were
veterans, less time was necessary for integration with the original members.
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The 153e RI's first foray into the firestorm of Verdun was a devastating experience. Leaving their billets
at the Fort de Regret, they arrived at the battlefield on February 27. Held in reserve until March 4, the
regiment suffered 231 casualties solely from German artillery.[27] On that day, Biesse was ordered to
relieve the 146e RI along the road from Fort Douaumont to Bras (see Appendix A). The 1 stand
3rd Battalions were in the first line, with 2nd and the CMRs in the reserve. The entirety of the 146eRI's
machinegun complement was also on the line. The regiment lost nearly 350 men over the next five days,
and the Germans had yet to launch an attack.[28] Finally, at noon on March 9 "the bombardment of the
preceding days began again, and doubled in intensity."[29] The enemy launched an infantry assault
against the junction between the 153e RI and the neighboring Chasseurs a Pied.[30] Rather than hold the
initial position against well-sited German artillery, Biesse withdrew his right flank to the second line,
intentionally opening a salient between the two French forts. This drew the Germans into a deadly
crossfire which prevented any further gains. Biesse launched a counterattack with nearly four
companies and the Chasseurs at 1930h. The advance was hellish. One French soldier noted that he "had
to go to the Ravine of the Dead, with two comrades, to cut the barbed wire. We found two wounded
who had been there for two days between the French and German lines. We conducted them to the
first aid post. How they thanked us! I saw, in the Ravine of the Dead, entire platoons mown down by the
machineguns."[31] The Germans responded with several machineguns, flamethrowers, and infantry
numbering "precisely double the force of the relief."[32] As a result of these reinforcements, The French
cancelled the attack after an hour.
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The next day three more assaults were launched against the 153e RI, each stopped "by our machineguns
and fusillade."[33] With the exception of the CMRs, the regiment was then relieved. However, the
casualties had been severe. Over sixteen days at the crest of Froideterre the regiment lost 35% of its full
strength, as well as two commandants.[34] Their actions at Froideterre earned them a fourragère rouge
by GQG, one of the highest honors that could be bestowed upon a regiment. A French ambulance driver
present at the battle stated that the 153e RI and her sister regiments played "a role [in the battle] of
which the sovereign importance surpasses all human anticipations."[35] The intentional withdrawal of
the 153e RI's right flank is not an event one expects to see at Verdun. Famous for such aphorisms as
"they shall not pass" and given the well-documented orders of de Castelnau that no ground must be
ceded to the enemy, this display of pragmatism against German artillery is surprising.[36] In fact, Petain,
a more conservative commander, was already in command of the defense and his defensively-minded
theory that "men cannot fight against materiel" was being implemented. The effectiveness of the
decision by Colonel Biesse to undertake this withdrawal on his own initiative is obvious. Despite the
failure of the French counterattack, the German assault was generally unsuccessful. The only territory
lost was sacrificed for a much more favorable position with the support of casemates Pamards.[37] All
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of the German attacks on March 10, despite being well-concentrated and supported by artillery, were
stopped by a mere two companies.
Junior officers also distinguished themselves during the Froideterre actions. On March 10, following the
failed French counterattack, Lieutenant Nicholas Schreiner was the commanding officer of the front line
trenches against which the Germans launched their three infantry assaults. With his "energy and
personal bravery" these attacks were stopped with minimal casualties.[38] The French counterattack
produced its own acts of bravery as well. Sous-Lieutenant Andre Declerk, who had returned to duty after
being gravely wounded in October 1914, acted as a liaison officer, coordinating his battalion's
movements with the orders from the regiment.[39] While he conducted himself well in the attack, he
lost his right leg two days later during a German bombardment.[40]
The importance of the NCOs should not be underestimated. Given the exceptionally high junior officer
casualty rate (all of the above-mentioned officers were either wounded or killed at Froideterre), it often
fell to the sergeants and corporals to either hold a position or continue an attack. Sergeant Valentin
Veillet, for example, was among those squad leaders who was not only able to capture some of the
enemy trenches during the counterattack of March 9, but held them for a considerable amount of time
against the German attacks.[41] Likewise, Sergeant Louis Gerdolle led the patrol during the
counterattack which found the survivors in the Ravine de la Mort "a few meters from the
enemy."[42] Unlike Private Buscail, who was also present for their rescue, Gerdolle was decorated with
the Medaille Militaire for his "difficult reconnaissance during a counterattack."[43] Corporal Francois
Fournaud took it upon himself to track the enemy positions while they were preparing for a
counterattack. For six excruciating hours, during which artillery and machinegun fire continually
harassed his position, Fournaud transmitted the German movements on March 10, giving the French
time to prepare for the three assaults that day.[44]
Despite these horrendous losses, it was the regiment's second action at Verdun, at Cote 304, that was
the most taxing (see Appendix B). President Poincaré, who visited the regiment after the Froideterre
engagement, noted that they still maintained "a magnificent allure."[45] After weeks of recuperation
and training, the mood before their redeployment was grim. On April 4 Roger Cauvin, a private soldier,
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wrote the following to his parents: "We are leaving tomorrow for the trenches. Before the 'over-the-top'
as we call it, I would want to erase by my words, if not by my actions, the agonies that I have caused
you… This letter will arrive to you if an accident comes upon me… I thank you for your prayers for God to
protect me…, Roger."[46] He died five days later at the Bois de Camard, during the fourth of five
German assaults on his position. Cauvin was one of 1,324 casualties during this second tour at Verdun.

Biesse launched a concentrated attack with the 69e and 146e RI upon arrival, It was "immediately
stopped by the machineguns and artillery of the enemy."[47] Following several days of bombardment,
the Germans attacked on April 7. Following the newly-adopted Defense-in-Depth model, Colonel Biesse
positioned the regiment in three entrenched lines of resistance, bordered on each side by fortresses.
The first line, under the command of Commandant Bonnaud, defended from Peyroux to Vassincourt.
This line contained six companies, half of the regiment's strength, which allowed for a substantial force
to defend against the enemy attack. The second and third lines, at the Bois de Camard and the crest of
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Cote 304, each contained three infantry companies. The machineguns were distributed along the first
and second lines.[48] The regiments positioning allowed for a number of tactical options.
First, it kept half of their forces in reserve, preventing any chance of a complete breakthrough. Second,
the strength of the second line meant that any penetration would be countered by fresh troops. Both
the French and their German adversaries often broke through the enemy's first line of defenses, only to
be stopped by the second. This gave the initiative to the defenders, who either launched a
counterattack or withdrew to the second line. Despite the strength of this position, these provisions
only barely halted the German assault.
The Germans began their bombardment of the French positions "after a relatively calm morning," at
Vassincourt.[49] A sergeant from the 26e RI, to Bonnaud's immediate left, described the bombardment
as "continuous and terrifying. We had never experienced its like during the whole campaign… The
trench no longer existed."[50] Beginning at 1700h, elements of the German VI Reserve Corps launched
repeated attacks against Bonnaud's position. After fierce hand-to-hand combat, the first German assault
was driven back. At 1750h a second attack was launched. Bonnaud's forces already suffered significant
casualties from the bombardment and the first attack, and 1stCompany was pushed from the trenches at
Peyroux. The loss of this position had several ramifications. It prevented Biesse from obtaining an
accurate report of his casualties; most could not be reclaimed by the French. This meant that of the 827
casualties taken, 732 were listed as 'missing,' and only 22 as 'killed.' However, the only significant
collection of French prisoners at Cote 304 occurred elsewhere on March 20. In this case, the term
'missing' refers to disintegration by artillery.[51] Just as in early March, the reorganization of the front
also created a dangerous salient in the German lines. Strong French positions still flanked the attackers,
and any further German attacks would suffer severe casualties, with no guarantee of the acquisition of
ground.
Despite sustaining the near destruction of two companies, the 153e RI withstood several more attacks.
On April 8, the Germans began targeting "destructive fire at the Bois de Camard."[52] The next day, the
Germans launched two more attacks against the remaining French forces at Vassincourt and Peyroux.
However, French enfilade fire was provided against this action and the German forces "could not
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progress."[53] Two companies were "rather tested by the bombardment" and relieved.[54] These two
days, while tactically successful, brought the regiment's losses to well over one third of its initial
strength. Unable to enlarge its hold in the recently-taken French trenches, the German forces launched
an infiltration assault against the Bois de Camard. The French repelled it with minimal losses. A lull
appeared in the fighting, and Biesse took advantage of this opportunity to build three listening posts and
repair the fortifications of the first and second lines. This period also provides the first mention of
French artillery fire by the 153e RI at Verdun. Despite these "rather calm" days, the regiment still took 90
casualties from German artillery and patrols. On the night of April 13, 2ndBattalion of the Chasseurs a
Pied relieved Biesse and his men, whowere transported back to the reserve. Despite losses of roughly
fifty percent, the 153e RI managed to maintain the majority of their defensive position against repeated
enemy assaults. Without significant support from French artillery, they held against "the heaviest
bombardment since the start of the battle on February 21."[55]
The fighting at Cote 304 produced its own share of exemplary combatants. Among the most prominent
of these was Lieutenant Charles-Ernest Harpin, who was awarded the Legion d'Honneur for the second
time for his actions on April 9. He lost an eye while defending his position against an enemy
assault.[56] Morale was not neglected under these fierce conditions either, though it was largely the
enlisted men and NCOs, rather than the officers, who were vital in this role.[57] Private Emile Petit, a
veteran, "always at the first line, [was] a constant example of calm and good spirits under the most
violent bombardments."[58] Similarly, Private Edouard Balloux, during one particularly harrowing
bombardment, managed to convince many of his comrades, who were either retreating or hiding in
cover, to leave their shelter and face the enemy.[59]
The 153e RI's actions at Cote 304 displayed a surprising tenacity when faced with enemy forces. The
continuous bombardments and infantry assaults provided little respite, and despite initially being
rebuffed during a counterattack and losing part of their first line, Biesse's complex defense prevented
the Germans from taking more than a few yards of trenches. The relief of the 69e RI was undertaken
"without incident."[60] Four of five German attacks were repulsed, and the one that succeeded failed to
eject the regiment from all of its front-line defenses. At Froideterre, despite suffering nearly sixty
percent of its casualties from artillery alone, the 153e RI was a fundamental part of the operation which
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prevented Verdun's fall. In addition, the deliberate withdrawal from the front trench lines to the more
defensible fortresses provides an image quite different from the rigid, static defense espoused by
General Nivelle later in the battle.
In fact, on the day of the final German attack against the 153e RI at Cote 304, the regiment received its
own order to "defend at all costs."[61] This action was not only successful in its undertaking, but caused
significant German reversals. Despite these significant defensive triumphs, the 153e RI failed in both of
its offensive actions, and suffered substantial casualties.[62] These defeats can be largely attributed to a
lack of infantry firepower and artillery. As the concentration of firepower was central to French
methods, this was a grievous loss. The French artillery did not reach parity with the Germans until well
into the battle, and this precluded the effectiveness of any counterattack. Likewise, infantry regiments
had not yet received the most effective mobile weapons of the war, such as light machineguns or semiautomatic rifles.[63] While French rifle grenades and mortars were both deadly, they were clearly not
enough to supplement an infantry assault on their own. The best infantry weapons, the Hotchkiss
machinegun and the 37mm light cannon, were practically immobile and thus limited to the defense. In
the realm of defensive operations, however, the doctrines and equipment utilized by the regiment
clearly showed extraordinary effectiveness by First World War standards.
One of the key issues within any military analysis is the relationship between planning and execution.
There are many generalizations and misconceptions about the Battle of Verdun, and a good number of
those were propagated by the French High Command. The most prominent generalization was that of
the immediate counter-attack. During the earliest stages of the battle, Joffre notified Petain that, "the
best way of arresting any succeeding efforts of the enemy would be by retaking the ground which he
had conquered."[64] Dozens of local counterattacks to arrest the German advance followed. These were
not usually successful in regaining lost territory, but were designed to wrest the initiative from the
Germans. Even General Mangin, the quintessential Attaque a l'Outrance commander, noted that "it was
only on March 4 that the French front was stable for a few weeks… Without doubt, the counterattacks
proscribed rarely procured any appreciable gains of ground…"[65] Despite the fairly consistent failures
of French counterattacks (with some notable exceptions), both Joffre and Mangin believed that they
"broke the German offensive."[66]
30
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At both of the battlefields at Verdun, the 153e RI launched early counterattacks. At Froideterre, it was
immediately following Biesse's tactical retreat, and while at Cote 304 it was upon arriving at the front
lines. These actions were certainly consistent with Joffre's tenir policy, but both attacks were cancelled
very quickly.[67] The outnumbered Froideterre counterattack was repulsed by a heavy German
presence of nearly two battalions, and made little progress. It lasted only an hour. The casualties, while
substantial, were hardly crippling, and it was launched in conjunction with the neighboringChasseurs a
Pied. Likewise, the counterattack at Cote 304 was unsuccessful. This was a much larger attack, with the
support of both the 69e RI and the 146e RI, and did manage to recover some ground before being
pushed back. Proportionally, the regiment suffered fewer casualties than the previous attack.[68] Given
the brevity of these attempts, it is unlikely that they would be capable of checking the German assault in
any meaningful fashion as Joffre and Mangin imagined. In fact, the only decrease in enemy activity in
the 153e RI's sectors occurred after a number of German assaults had been repulsed.
At Froideterre, the Germans launched three well-supported attacks the very next day, while at Cote 304,
they were able to launch five over several days. From these examples, it is clear that the unsuccessful
French attacks had little immediate impact on the stability of their local fronts. Over time, it was
certainly the case that German units suffered, but this was largely a result of the French 'Noria' system
pulling battered divisions from the front line. As Petain noted, "The Germans, on the contrary,
maintained most of their units on the spot…as a result, most of their officers were eventually wiped
out."[69] For the short term tactical situation, however, these attacks did little more than to diminish
the French ranks for little to no gain. When coupled with Petain's reluctance to expend unnecessary
lives in such actions, Joffre's belief that these localized counterattacks were crucial to checking the
German advance is pure fantasy.
The reasons for these failures are rooted within the French industrial machine of the Great War. As
stated previously, the bulk of French tactical considerations came from the massed concentration and
distribution of firepower. In early 1916, while several steps had been taken to further this doctrine,
weapons production and development simply could not keep up with demand. Heavy artillery
production was particularly low, and the French were forced to rely on the Mle 1897 75mm field
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artillery piece.[70] In the open, it was easily the most advanced field gun used by any power during the
Great War, but in the static confines of trench warfare its usefulness deteriorated rapidly.
In terms of morale, it is evident that the 153e RI displayed resilience as well. Despite suffering thirty
percent losses in a single day, the regiment was able to maintain its position for an additional four days
without relief, under the onslaught of massive German artillery. The Journal de Marche does not
indicate any morale issues, which leads to two possibilities. First, that there were no cases of faltering
morale. While this may be true, given the intense casualties suffered by the 153e RI, a crisis of
confidence could arise. This is concurrent with Ousby's psychological treatise which noted that "there
was definitely a problem of morale at Verdun…."[71] There is a more plausible conclusion: While there
may have been issues of morale, they were not significant enough to impede the unit's functionality.
Another important development, whose usage was increasing, was the company-level detachment. In
several cases at both Cote 304 and Froideterre the 153e RI was bolstered by units from other regiments.
In a manner consistent with the Firepower doctrine, these were usually machinegun companies.
Additionally, companies, rather than battalions, were often rotated in and out of the line to preserve
their strength. The regiment became a flexible unit, capable of rearranging itself to fit the conditions of
the battlefield. Pragmatism replaced rigidity.
While the 153e RI's actions at Cote 304 and Froideterre both share a number of similarities in their
timeline and in their conclusion, there are a number of distinct differences that a subtle evolution of
methods. These two engagements were several weeks apart, during which time the 153e RI involved
itself with training, after-action reports, and time for hindsight on their previous actions. The similarities
between the two battles tend to be broader in scale, while the differences are centralized to the
deployment of forces and the nature of the French response to German aggression.
The first such similarity is in the nature of the French position. During both occasions, the 153e RI was
on the defensive against superior numbers of German soldiers, and part of a relatively continuous battle
line. This is crucial to any comparison of the Cote 304 and Froideterre battles, as under both
circumstances they shared the same objectives: to hold ground against the enemy, and if possible to
retake ground previously lost. This defensive posture also displays the relative inferiority of both French
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artillery and infantry numbers. The German General von Falkenhayen had committed 1,220 artillery
pieces to complement the massive strength of Crown Prince Wilhelm's Fifth Army.[72] In contrast to the
well-equipped and highly motivated Germans, the initial French defense comprised a few dilapidated
divisions with a couple of understrength elite units, such as Driant's Chasseurs a Pied. French artillery
was practically nonexistent. It was not until late February, when General Balroufier's XX Corps arrived,
that the French defenders developed any sense of parity with the enemy infantry. Artillery equivalence
would not arrive until the summer. These circumstances absolutely required a defensive posture,
limiting many of the French Army's options.
A second congruence can be found in the terrain of the battlefield. The area around Froideterre is a vast,
complex collection of hills and ravines. The road from Douaumont to Bras upon which the 153e RI
positioned itself rises above the Ravine de la Dame, named after a nearby farm. Simply stated,
thisRavine de la Mort, as it came to be known, was a deathtrap deep within no-man's-land. Within the
firing arcs of both French and German weapons, large bodies of soldiers always took heavy casualties
when advancing.[73] Their bodies were rarely recovered until the French solidified the position in
December 1916. The rest of the French position was sited along the many crests of the Froideterre hill,
providing ample opportunity to view and impede advancing German soldiers. Cote 304 itself is an
imposing hill whose name gives its height in meters. It is deceptively steep; its slowly-sloping sides are at
a much more taxing angle than appears at first glance. While today the area is heavily forested, the
consistent artillery barrages turned the hill into "a lunar landscape."[74] Again, this gave the French
exceptional coverage of the areas through which the Germans would advance. Any attacks would have
limited cover, and would traverse the steep incline under heavy fire.
The third similarity is the direct actions of the 153e RI in holding these areas. At both locales the
regiment launched a counterattack with support from units from other regiments. In both instances,
they failed. Following these counterattacks, the Germans launched their own series of offensives which
met with limited success. And in both Cote 304 and Froideterre, the limited German successes occurred
largely because of significant enfilade fire from small fortresses and neighboring units. This enfilade fire
was a direct result of the retreat of certain elements of the French line to their secondary positions.
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These actions are largely concurrent with Petain's orders to preserve the lives of soldiers and Joffre's
insistent commands to maintain every inch of French territory.
From these general similarities, one might assume that the 153e RI did not change or adapt its
stratagems to fit the battlefield conditions. This concept diminishes the amount of initiative granted to
regimental commanders at Verdun. Very few orders from the division, brigade, or corps levels make any
appearance in the Journal de Marche, and those that do are limited to general observations, such as
"The 11th and 39th DIs were called, under the orders of CinC of 20th corps, to progressively enter the
sector in the region Malancourt-Bessincourt."[75] And it is within these regimental decisions that the
many subtle differences are seen between the two engagements. Despite the many similarities between
Cote 304, on the left bank of the Meuse, and Froideterre, on the right, each provides its own unique
challenges. Historian Malcolm Brown notes that "there are distinct topographical differences between
the two sides of the river…the heaved up, much ravined territory of the right bank was suitable for
German infiltration tactics…the left bank, by contrast… was too open for such techniques."[76] This
meant that on the left bank, the French Firepower doctrine had the potential to be far more successful
than on the right. This is demonstrated by the amount of attacks sustained by the 153e RI on the left
bank over such a short period of time.[77] The German artillery also spent far more time softening up
the French positions on the right bank than on the left.
Another of the key differences between the two engagements was Colonel Biesse's deployment of his
forces. Rather than as a result of topographical considerations, these differences were a response to the
respective stage within the larger battle. When the 153e RI arrived at Verdun on February 25,
thesituation was quite desperate. The French defenders were on the verge of "crumbling at any
moment."[78] General Chretien's XXX Corps (Verdun's initial garrison) had been bloodied to the point of
collapse, and General Balfrouier's XX Corps was only just arriving. Thus, when the 153e RI arrived on the
front lines, the defenses were still largely improvised, with few of the dedicated trench systems which
otherwise permeated the Western Front.
When one considers the woeful state of Verdun's defensive works before the battle, it is clear that the
regiment could not defend a well-endowed fortress. Douaumont had already fallen, robbing the French
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of their greatest asset on the right bank, and the other fortresses had been stripped of their heavy
artillery.[79] The deployment of the regiment itself reflects this state of affairs; while the front line
battalions maintained a fairly strong position, the reserves were a fairly standard thirty percent of the
unit. This displacement was certainly effective, and the German attacks were usually stymied very
quickly, but it is clearly the work of improvisation along a rapidly shifting (by Great War standards, at
least) front line. The trenches and fortifications were fairly limited in scope, and the only major
defensive works were the prewar forts. In complete contrast to Froideterre, Cote 304 was the site of a
month-old engagement, and up to that point the front had shifted very little. As such, the trench lines
were vastly more complex, and included multiple layers spread out over a square kilometer. The 153e RI
moved into a three-tiered defensive network, with fully half of their forces in reserve so as to limit
casualties from both enemy artillery and an initial breakthrough.
The employment of the forces available to the regiment again shows a number of important differences.
The most prevalent of these was the withdrawal of certain units from the front line. At Froideterre,
where the battle lines were quite fluid, the action of redeploying the 2nd and 3rdcompanies to the second
lines was a deliberate effort to draw the enemy in to an unfavorable position where they could be
destroyed. This was a fundamental concept of the Defense-in-Depth strategy, and served the regiment's
purposes well.
At Cote 304, however, the retreat of the French at Peyroux was a result of a ferocious German
bombardment and assault. The Journal de Marche states that "the survivors of the 1st company and
some other isolated units were only able to rally at the second line under the cover of darkness."[80]The
failure of the first line to hold the village of Peyroux was only mitigated by the complex defensive
networks established by the second line at the Bois de Camard. Despite this important difference of
impetus for the withdrawal of forces, the results were fairly similar. During both occasions, the Germans
were drawn into a crossfire from which they could not progress any further. Casualties on April 7 at Cote
304 were significantly higher than those at Froideterre on March 9.[81] This is surprising given the
haphazard nature of the defenses at Froideterre, but power of the German offensive explains the
discrepancy. While the initial assault against Verdun on February 21 involved a whirlwind of artillery and
overwhelming numerical superiority, by early March the advances had outstripped their supply lines and
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the German artillery, while potent, was no longer the only piece necessary to guarantee victory.
Contrariwise, the April assault on Cote 304 was among the heaviest bombardments of the entire battle,
with a well-supported infantry advance over a wide frontage.[82]
Verdun's role as a social and psychological event has never been in doubt. The vast majority of French
histories on the battle point to its nearly-unprecedented impact on the public consciousness. Pacifism,
communism, and the surrealist movement all developed as a result of the horrors of Verdun (and other
contemporary battles). French military thinkers saw the battle in a similar light. The prevailing wisdom
following the war was that France could never again afford another Verdun, and the bulk of military
expenditures would go towards that goal. Different views emerged over the following years providing
sharp contrasts in philosophy. Winston Churchill wrote during the battle that "meeting an artillery
attack is like catching a cricket ball. Shock is dissipated by drawing back the hands. A little 'give,' a little
suppleness, and the violence of impact is vastly reduced."[83] This was echoed by Charles de Gaulle, a
veteran of Verdun, in his work "Towards a Professional Army," where he espoused a mobile attack force
based on armor, aircraft, and mobile artillery.[84] He noted that "We cannot rely on a hasty defensive
by uncertain formations to bear the first shock."[85]
These were the exceptions rather than the norm, however. While many commanders, such as Joffre,
Foch, and Mangin maintained their "Cult of the Offensive" after the war, they had little impact on
French military developments. Joffre was in disgrace after his bungling of the Somme Offensive. Foch
died in 1929, embittered against a France that had agreed to the "capitulation…treason" of the Treaty of
Versailles.[86] Mangin died in 1925 after being mired in controversy surrounding his actions as Inspector
General of the occupied Rhineland. Other offensively minded officers, such as Nivelle, had been
marginalized far earlier. This left Petain and his defensively-minded theorems as the primary driver of
military thought. Petain himself was in various administrative positions within the French Army for the
bulk of the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s, including Inspector General of the Army and Minister of
War. His cautious view of warfare that had served him so well at Verdun became the hallmark of future
technological and tactical developments. Unsurprisingly, given the effectiveness of Fort Vaux at Verdun,
prepared defenses were to be the primary shield against further German aggression. The Maginot Line,
to some, was a symbol of French military might and ingenuity; to one right-wing politician on the eve of
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the

Treaty

of

Munich,

it

was

"a

policy

of

weakness

and

abdication—a

policy

of

retrenchment."[87] Regardless of the fortresses' effectiveness, there is no doubt that the Maginot Line
was a "tangible consequence of Verdun."[88]
In addition to the effectiveness of the forts, the sheer numbers of casualties inflicted also inspired much
of Verdun's influence. The French at Verdun alone took 378,000 casualties; their losses for the war
entire were around five percent of their total population.[89] This led to severe reductions in military
personnel, as well as a major crisis for future French conscription classes. These "hollow classes," as they
were termed, dramatically lessened France's confidence in her ability to fight another war with
Germany. Again, this pushed the French towards a more defensive posture. The wheel had now come
full circle. Colonel de Grandmaison had attributed France's defeat in 1870 to overly defensive postures
and a lack of initiative. Most of the failures of the Great War were perceived as a product of the Attaque
a l'Outrance strategy and its blind lack of caution. Now France was again releasing its hold on the
strategic initiative and leaving it in the hands of their Teutonic adversaries. Over the course of both
actions at Verdun, the 153e RI lost 2284 men out of a maximum strength of roughly 2800. These horrific
numbers were not unique to this regiment, nor were they particularly uncommon.
This essay has argued that the 153e RI was not an extraordinary unit, but rather that its history was
indicative of the French Army as a whole. During the height of the 153e RI's struggle to hold its position
at Cote 304, Petain stated that "April 9 is a glorious day for our armies. The furious assaults of the
soldiers of the Crown Prince have been broken… Courage… we will get them!"[90] The 153e RI, and by
extension her sister regiments, presented to their enemies and to their allies a wealth of tactical
acumen, as well as dogged tenacity. Not only were they capable of halting the tactically astute German
Army in their tracks, but they were willing to brave, time and again, the inferno of Verdun.
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